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THE DETERMINATIVE FACTS
In its Statement of the Case, Carpets of America claims that Mrs. Lindstrom
"mischaracterizes the factual findings" (Brief of the Appellee 3), and by including
numerous facts in its Statement of Facts that were not included in Mrs. Lindstrom's
Statement of Facts, Carpets of America suggests that Mrs. Lindstrom has overlooked key
facts (id. 4-7). While Mrs. Lindstrom disputes at least one non-relevant fact asserted by
~

Carpets of America, 1 she does not dispute and has not mischaracterized the findings as to
the determinative facts, which are these:

1.

The Lindstroms' Divorce Decree, dated January 5, 2010, granted Paul
Lindstrom's interest in the Home to Mrs. Lindstrom. (R. 13-14, 122.)

2.

The Notice of Lien was recorded on February 23, 2011, and the Clarified
Notice of Lien was recorded on June 15, 2011. (R. 16, 21, 123.)

3.

The Divorce Decree was not recorded until July 11, 2011. (R. 22, 123.)

4.

The Promissory Note purporting to authorize the Notice of Lien and
Clarified Notice of Lien was signed by Paul Lindstrom. (R. 16-17, 122-23.)

5.

On February 11, 2014, Mrs. Lindstrom sent Carpets of America a letter
informing it that the Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien are
wrongful liens and asking it to remove them. (R. 28, 123.)

6.

Carpets of America has refused to remove the Notice of Lien and Clarified
Notice of Lien. (R. 123.)

1

Carpets of America asserts that "[w]hether or not the proceeds of [Paul's] debt [to
Carpets of America] were used by Mrs. Lindstrom or for household expenses [has] yet to
be determined." (Brief of the Appellee 4.) But Mrs. Lindstrom submitted undisputed
affidavit testimony that "the debt to which [the Promissory Note] referred was not
incurred for household purposes or for improvement to the Home." (R. 31.)

1
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ARGUMENT

I.

MRS. LINDSTROM'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT WAS A
PROPER RULE 59 MOTION.

A.

The Court should review this issue de novo.

Mrs. Lindstrom asserted in her opening brief that whether the trial court erred by
concluding that her Motion to Alter Judgment was actually a motion to reconsider is an
issue that should be reviewed de novo. (Brief of the Appellant 1.) Carpets of America
argues that this issue should be reviewed for clear error. (Brief of the Appellee 11.) In so
arguing, Carpets of America notes that any of the following three factual findings can
properly support a conclusion that an ostensible rule 59 motion is actually a motion to
reconsider: (1) a finding that the motion was not "'properly styled"'; (2) a finding that the
motion did not "plausibly request[] the relevant relief'; or (3) a finding that the motion
was filed in "'bad faith or with knowledge that the Trial Court would recast it as a motion
to reconsider."' (Id. (citations omitted).) Carpets of America then says that "factual
conclusions ... should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard." (Id.)
While it is true that factual findings are ordinarily reviewed for clear error, see,

e.g., Terry v. Bacon, 2011 UT App 432, ,I 12, 269 P.3d 188, "a trial court's 'findings'
based upon undisputed facts present questions of law on appeal." State v. Sampson, 808
P .2d 1100, 1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in

State v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826, 827 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1994); accord Diversified
Equities, Inc. v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
("'Where the facts are not in material dispute, interpretation placed thereon by trial court

2
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becomes a question of law which is not conclusive on appeal."' (citation omitted)). The
~

facts related to the Motion to Alter Judgment are undisputed; thus, the characterization of
that motion as a motion to reconsider should be reviewed de novo, regardless of whether

~

the trial court's decision was a factual finding or a legal conclusion.

B.

The undisputed facts do not support the findings on which
the trial court implicitly or expressly relied to conclude
that Mrs. Lindstrom's Motion to Alter Judgment was
actually a motion to reconsider.

The trial court did not expressly make any of the three findings identified by
Carpets of America as being sufficient to support a conclusion that a purported rule 59
motion is actually a motion to reconsider. (See R. 189.) Moreover, even if one of those
findings were deemed to be implicit in the trial court's conclusion that Mrs. Lindstrom's
~

Motion to Alter Judgment was actually a motion to reconsider, that finding is not
supported by the undisputed facts. First, the undisputed facts show that Mrs. Lindstrom's
Motion to Alter Judgment was properly styled since rule 59 specifically refers to
"[m]otion[s] to alter or amend a judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e). Second, the undisputed
facts show that her motion plausibly requested the relevant relief. Rule 59 allows a trial
court to "open the judgment ... [and] make new ... conclusions, and direct entry of a
new judgment" if the original judgment was based on an "[e]rror in law." Utah R. Civ. P.
59(a)(7). Mrs. Lindstrom's Motion to Alter Judgment asserted that the trial court made an
error of law, and it requested "a new conclusion of law and an altered judgment based on
that new conclusion." (R. 135.) Hence, her motion plausibly requested relevant rule 59

~

relief.

3
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Finally, a finding of "bad faith or ... knowledge that the trial court would recast
[the motion] as a motion to reconsider" is erroroneous if there is "nothing in the record"
to support that finding. See Express Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Reuling, 2015 UT App 299, ,I
8, 364 P.3d 766. Here, Carpets of America has pointed to nothing in the record to support
the notion that Mrs. Lindstrom filed her Motion to Alter Judgment in bad faith.
Additionally,just as the record in Express Recovery Services "suggest[ed] that [the
appellants in that case] reasonably believed [their] motion tolled the time for filing an
appeal until the trial court disposed of the motion," id., the record here suggests that Mrs.
Lindstrom likewise believed that her motion tolled the time for filing an appeal (see R.
133 n.1). Her Motion to Alter Judgment expressly states the belief that "the time for
filing a notice of appeal [will] run[] from entry of the order resolving [the Motion to Alter
Judgment]." (Id.) The undisputed facts show that Mrs. Lindstrom did not file her Motion
to Alter Judgment in bad faith or with knowledge that it would be recast as a motion to
reconsider.
The one basis on which the trial court expressly rested its conclusion that Mrs.
Lindstrom's Motion to Alter Judgment was actually a motion to reconsider was this:
"Even though counsel has styled it as a Motion to Alter Judgment, the same arguments
are being presented to the Court and counsel is asking the Court to reconsider the same
arguments presented at the November 21, 2014 hearing." (R. 189.) In B.A.M.
Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2012 UT 26,282 P.3d 41, the Utah Supreme

Court rejected the idea that an otherwise proper rule 59 motion could be deemed an
improper motion to reconsider because "it was essentially a 'rehash' of arguments made
4
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~

[previously]." Id.
l.:ZI

,r 12. Thus, the trial court's one express basis for concluding that Mrs.

Lindstrom's Motion to Alter Judgment was actually a motion to reconsider is not a proper
basis for such a conclusion. See id.
Because the undisputed facts do not support the findings Carpets of America
apparently believes were implicit in the trial court's conclusion, and because the one
"finding" on which the trial court expressly relied was not a proper basis for its

~

conclusion, this Court should hold that the trial court erred by concluding that the Motion
to Alter Judgment was a motion to reconsider.

II.

UTAH'S RACE-NOTICE STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO
THIS CASE.
A.

A lien does not create or transfer title; thus, its holder is
not a "purchaser" under the race-notice statute.

Carpets of America's argument on the wrongful lien issue is based primarily on
the assertion that "this case deal[ s] with the recording priority of two documents
(6)

conveying title" and that "[t]his dispute [therefore] triggers Utah's Race-Notice
provisions." (Brief of Appellee 16; see also id. at 13, 16-26.) Carpets of America is
mistaken. The race-notice statute does not apply here.
Utah's race-notice statute states as follows:
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
( 1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith
and for a valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.

~

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann.§ 57-3-103 (2010). This Court has said that the foregoing "section 57-3103 provides that unrecorded documents are void against a subsequent 'purchaser' who
took title in good faith." F.D.lC. v. Taylor, 2011 UT App 416, if 33,267 P.3d 949

(emphasis added); accord Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26, ,r 14,254 P.3d 71 (stating that
"'a subsequent purchaser must take [title to] the property"' (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)). Thus, if a document is "ineffective to transfer title, [its holder is] not a
'purchaser' covered by section 57-3-103." Taylor, 2011 UT App 416, ,r 33.
As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, a lien does not transfer title:
This Court has defined the term "lien" as a legal charge collectible out of
specific property for the payment of a debt. Being only a charge against or
encumbrance on property, a lien does not create a title to, or an estate
interest in the property. In other words, a lien gives the lienholder a right to
collect his debt out of the charged property, but it does not give him an
ownership interest in the property.
Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg., NV., 663 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1983) (internal citations

omitted). In sum, because a lien does not convey title, a person who holds a lien is not a
purchaser covered by section 57-3-103, the race-notice statute.
This Court's analysis in Taylor further supports the conclusion that the race-notice
statute does not apply to give liens priority over prior unrecorded interests. In Taylor, this
Court implicitly acknowledged that in Utah a trust deed associated with a mortgage is
ordinarily effective to transfer title (in trust) and, therefore, that the race-notice statute
applies to give such a trust deed priority over a prior unrecorded interest. See 2011 UT
App 416, ,r,r 25-28. However, the Court observed that the race-notice statute does not
apply to give priority to a mere mortgage lien, which results when a trust deed is

6
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defective, in that it does not transfer title, because it does not name the trustee or is
executed by someone who does not have title to the property. Id.

~if 28-29, 33. By

applying the race-notice statute to trust deeds that convey title but not to defective trust
deeds that only create liens, this Court confinned in Taylor that the race-notice statute
does not apply to liens like Carpets of America's Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of
Lien. Id.

ilil 25-33.

Carpets of America obtained from Paul Lindstrom a Promissory Note that gave it
the "right to record and/or file liens against all real and personal property [then] held, or
~

[there]after acquired, by [Paul]." (R. 16.) That Promissory Note and the Notice of Lien
and Clarified Notice of Lien recorded pursuant to it did not, however, convey title to
Carpets of America. Citizens Bank, 633 P.2d at 59. Thus, Carpets of America is not a
"purchaser" covered by section 57-3-103. Taylor, 2011 UT App 416, if 33. Because
Carpets of America is not a "purchaser," the race-notice statute does not apply to this
case. See id. Thus, to the extent that Carpets of America relies on the race-notice statute,
its arguments are unavailing.

B.

The cases that Carpets of America cites to support its
race-notice statute argument do not actually support that
argument.

Carpets of America cites Crompton v. Jenson, 1 P .2d 242 (Utah 1931 ), and Kemp

v. Zions First National Bank, 470 P.2d 390 (Utah 1970), in support of its assertion that
the race-notice statute does apply to this case. (Brief of the Appellee 19-20.) However,
neither case actually supports that assertion.

7
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As to Crompton, Carpets of America misrepresents, perhaps inadvertently, both
the facts and import of that case. With regard to the facts, Carpets of America states: "[In
Crompton] one mortgage was signed and delivered on May 3, 1904[, but t]hat mortgage,

even though it was entitled to be recorded, was not." (Brief of the Appellee 19.) Actually,
the May 3, 1904 mortgage was recorded. See Crompton, I P.2d at 243. Carpets of
America also states that a "[Ms.] McKinney was the holder of [a] later signed but first
recorded mortgage." (Brief of the Appellee 19.) Actually, Ms. McKinney was the holder
of the first signed, first recorded, May 3, 1904 mortgage. See Crompton, l P.2d at 243.
Ms. McKinney then assigned the first recorded mortgage to the Crompton plaintiff "a
short time before [the] suit [in that case] was begun." Id. at 244. Finally, Carpets of
America quotes the Crompton opinion as saying: "There is ... nothing in the record
before us which shows that Mr. [sic] McKinney, the then owner and holder of plaintiffs

~

mortgage, had either actual or constructive notice [of the earlier mortgage]." (Brief of the
Appellee 19 (bracketed language in Appellee's brief).) The bracketed language that
Carpets of America inserts into the foregoing quotation, coupled with the preceding
misrepresentation, indicates that Crompton dealt with the holder of a later, recorded
Cw

mortgage who was unaware of an earlier, unrecorded mortgage. (See id.) Actually,
Crompton dealt with the holder of an earlier, recorded mortgage who was not aware of a

later, recorded mortgage. 1 P.2d at 243-46.
With regard to the import of Crompton, Carpets of America states that the court in
that case "applied the principles of the Race-Notice statute to determine which party was
entitled to priority." (Brief of the Appellee 19.) Actually, the Crompton court applied a

8
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"statute of limitations" that appears to have had the effect of making an earlier mortgage
inferior to a later mortgage if the holder of the earlier mortgage did not bring suit to
foreclose his mortgage within six years of the date, or recording date, of the later
mortgage. See 1 P.2d at 242, 245. It is in this context that the Crompton court held, under
the relevant "statute of limitations" and Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 104 P. 117, 122 (Utah
1909), that "the rights of the holder of the [earlier] mortgage remain intact so long as
such holder was without actual or constructive notice for the full period of the statute of
limitations, that the property was subject to another mortgage." Crompton, I P.2d at 246.
~

Contrary to Carpets of America's representation, this holding has nothing to do with the
principles of the race-notice statute.
As to Kemp, Carpets of America is correct that it dealt with the priority of two
competing security interests and that the Kemp court held that the prior recorded
mortgage in that case took precedence over a later recorded but prior in time mortgage.
See Kemp, 470 P.2d at 391, 393; (Brief of Appellee 19-20). However, contrary to the

implication that Carpets of America would have this Court draw, the Kemp court did not
rely on the race-notice statute for its holding. See 470 P.2d at 393.
The prior in time but unrecorded mortgage in Kemp was a purchase money
mortgage given to the seller of the relevant land. Id. at 392. The later in time but first
~

recorded mortgage was given to a bank that supplied additional financing for the
purchase. Id. The Kemp court acknowledged that "'[w]here the contest is between a
purchase money mortgage to a third person who advances part of the purchase price ...
and a purchase money mortgage to the vendor ... for the balance, the latter is given

9
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preference even if he had notice of the former."' Id. at 393 (citation omitted). The court
then said, however, that "in spite of the foregoing generalities ... an examination of the

Ii

authorities and the principles involved will show that the result actually depends upon the
circumstances of the given case, the equities, and the effect of the recording act." Id.
Ci.

Then, without citing any statute, the Kemp court relied for its holding on the fact that the
seller in that case not only did not record his purchase money mortgage but gave "an
unrestricted warranty deed, knowing that the financing bank was going to rely on it" and

{ilii),

"went to the bank and in effect approved the transaction by accepting their share of the
proceeds therefrom, but without disclosing that they retained an interest." Id.
If the Kemp court had been applying the race-notice statute to the security interests
in that case, as Carpets of America implies, it would simply have cited the race-notice
statute and announced its holding since its holding would naturally flow from that statute,

~

if it applied. But it did not. Instead, the Kemp court relied on the particular circumstances
of that case, only part of which included the seller's failure to record its purchase money
mortgage. See id. The Kemp court's failure to cite the race-notice statute, which would
plainly control if it applied, actually supports the conclusion that the race-notice statute
does not operate in favor of a later recorded lien.
There is no indication in the Kemp opinion that the seller's purchase money
mortgage or the bank's financing in that case were accompanied by a trust deed. See id. at
391-93. This likely explains why the court treated them as liens, rather than as
instruments conveying title, and did not apply the race-notice statute. See supra at 5-7.
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III.

CARPETS OF AMERICA OFFERS NO OTHER EFFECTIVE
REBUTTAL TO THE WRONGFUL LIEN ARGUMENTS IN
MRS. LINDSTROM'S OPENING BRIEF.

A.

Carpets of America does not effectively rebut the argument
that the Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien each
meet the plain statutory definition of "wrongful lien."

In her opening brief, Mrs. Lindstrom demonstrates that the Notice of Lien and
Clarified Notice of Lien each meet the plain statutory definition of "wrongful lien"
because under Lund v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1983) (per curiam), and Wood
v. Wood, 2004 UT App 343U, 2004 WL 2192426, para. 5 (mem.), Paul was no longer an
~

owner of the Home when he signed the Promissory Note. (Brief of the Appellant 13-15.)
Carpets of America's response is two-fold. First, it asserts that Paul must be considered
an owner of the Home as of the time the Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien were
filed because that "is the only way to interpret the Wrongful Lien Statutes in harmony
with Utah's Race-Notice Statutes." (Brief of the Appellee 21; see also id. at 15, 20.)

&P

Second, Carpets of America argues that Lund's holding-which is that a divorce decree
giving marital property to one spouse divests the other spouse of any interest in that
property to which a lien could attach, regardless of whether the decree was recorded, 67 4
P.2d at 109-should apply only to cases involving judgment liens and not to cases
involving consensual liens. (Id. at 21-22.) Neither of these arguments is convincing.
First, a conclusion that Paul was still an owner of the Home when the Notice of
Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien were recorded is not required to harmonize the

({j

Wrongful Lien Act with the race-notice statute. As demonstrated above, the race-notice

11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

statute does not apply to this case. See supra at 5-7. Thus, there is no need to harmonize
the race-notice statute with the Wrongful Lien Act. They simply are not in conflict.
Carpets of America's second argument here is that the holding in Lund-that a
divorce decree giving marital property to one spouse divests the other of any interest in
that property to which a lien could attach, regardless of whether the decree was recorded,

674 P.2d at 109-should apply only to cases involving judgment liens and not to cases
involving consensual liens. 2 (Brief of the Appellee 21-22.) Initially, Carpets of America
fails to acknowledge that this Court applied in Wood, a case involving a consensual
security agreement, the same principle applied in Lund-that an "order issued by [a]
divorce court [granting marital property to one spouse] not only severe[s] any joint
tenancy interest that [the other spouse] may have had in the [p]roperty, it also
eliminate[ s] any ownership interest [the other spouse] otherwise might have retained in
the property." Wood, 2004 WL 2192426 at para. 5. Moreover, Carpets of America's
argument that Lund should not apply when a consensual lien is involved rests on Carpets
of America's mistaken view that as "a holder of a consensual lien ... [it] is ... entitled to
2

Carpets of America suggests that the Divorce Decree in this case did not convey Paul's
interest in the Home to Mrs. Lindstrom in any event because the Decree uses the phrase
"shall be awarded" rather than "is hereby awarded." (Brief of Appellee 16 n.4.) In fact,
the Decree uses "shall be" phrasing with regard to other significant matters as well. It
states: "Petitioner shall be awarded sole custody of the minor children" (R. 11 );
"Respondent shall be ordered to pay child support" (id.); and "Each party shall be
required to maintain medical insurance" (R. 12). Thus, under Carpets of America's
reasoning, not only was the Home never conveyed to Mrs. Lindstrom, but custody of the
children was never given to her, child support payments were never required of Paul, and
neither of them were ever required to maintain medical insurance. Surely that is not what
the court intended when it entered the Divorce Decree. Rather, its intent is plainly
reflected in this statement: "Petitioner shall be granted a Divorce ... , said Decree to
become final upon signing by the Court." (R. 10 (emphasis added).)

12
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the protections afforded to bona-fide purchasers" under the race-notice statute. (Brief of
~

the Appellee 25.) Again, because "a lien does not create a title to, or an estate interest in
the property," Citizens Bank, 663 P .2d at 59, no holder of a lien-consensual or
otheiwise-is entitled to the protections afforded a bona-fide purchaser under the racenotice statute, Taylor, 2011 UT App 416,133. This fact undermines any reason for
distinguishing between judgment liens and consensual liens in the application of Lund.
In sum, the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Lund and this Court's holding in

Wood both apply here and confirm that Paul was not an owner of the Home at the time
~

the Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien were filed. Because he was not an owner
at that time and yet was the only person who signed the document authorizing the Notice
of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien, this Court should conclude that both of those
documents are wrongful liens. See Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-102(12) (2014).

B.

Carpets of America does not effectively rebut the
argument that the addition of a knowledge requirement
into the definition of "wrongful lien" is at odds with the
plain language and structure of the Wrongful Lien Act.

In her opening brief, Mrs. Lindstrom demonstrates that the trial court's holdingwhich is that a document cannot be a wrongful lien if the person who authorizes it does
not know at the time of recording that it is wrongful-is at odds with the plain language
and structure of the Wrongful Lien Act. (Brief of the Appellant 16-18.) Specifically, Mrs.
Lindstrom demonstrates that a knowledge requirement is at odds with the language and
structure of the Wrongful Lien Act because the statutory definition of "wrongful lien"
contains no knowledge requirement and two of the three possible sanctions for recording
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a wrongful lien presuppose that the person recording the wrongful lien did not know at
the time of recording that the lien was wrongful. (Id.) Carpets of America offers no
analysis to dispute Mrs. Lindstrom's argument in this regard; instead, it simply asserts,
without citation to authority, that "[t]he fact that knowledge plays a role in the damage
provisions does not negate the role knowledge also plays in the initial question of
wrongfulness." (Brief of the Appellee 15.) That bald assertion is unavailing to rebut Mrs.
Lindstrom's statutory language and structure argument. See Winter v. Northwest Pipeline
Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991) ("This Court will not ... address [the appellant's]

argument ... because it is totally unsupported by legal analysis or authority."). Because
Carpets of America offers no cognizable rebuttal to Mrs. Lindstrom's convincing
demonstration that the trial court's holding is at odds with the language and structure of
the Wrongful Lien Act, this Court should reverse the trial court's holding and conclude
that the Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien are wrongful liens.

C.

Carpets of America does not effectively rebut the
argument that the trial court's holding is at odds with
Eldridge and Pratt.

The trial court relied for its holding in this case on this Court's quotation of
Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, ,I 50, 166 P.3d 639, in Pratt v. Pugh, 2010

UT App 219, ,I 13, 238 P.3d 1073. (See R. 124.) In her opening brief, Mrs. Lindstrom
demonstrated that both Eldridge and Pratt are factually distinguishable from this case and
that, in any event, the language from those cases on which the trial court relied is best
interpreted to mean exactly what it says, which is that the wrongfulness of a lien must be
determined in light of the facts "known" (passive voice)-i.e., as they existed-at the
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•

time the lien was recorded, not that the wrongfulness of a lien must be determined based
tJJ

on what was known at the time by the person who recorded it. (Brief of the Appellant 1824.) In response, Carpets of America makes no attempt to directly address Mrs.

~

Lindstrom's argument. In fact, Carpets of America itself states twice the very proposition
that Mrs. Lindstrom asserts-that the wrongfulness of a lien should be determined based
on the facts known, i.e., as they existed, at the time the lien was recorded: "Utah Code
Ann.§ 38-9-102[12] directs courts to only look at the facts and circumstances existing at
'the time it was recorded"' (Brief of the Appellee 14); and, "Based on the four factual
findings, the Trial Court concluded that [Paul] was to be considered a joint owner of the
[Home] - based upon the facts at the time of recording" (id. at 15).
Thus, rather than directly contest Mrs. Lindstrom's argument in this regard,
Carpets of America asserts ( 1) that "Lindstrom proposes that the facts known at the time
the lien was recorded are irrelevant" (id.); (2) that "Lindstrom contends that once she
provided notice of the Divorce Decree ... , such notice should retroactively make
Carpets of America's Liens wrongful" (id. at 16); and (3) that "Lindstrom's Appeal asks
this Court to do the very thing this Court has already disavowed [in Pratt]-namely,
converting Carpets of America's secured loan into an unsecured loan" (id. at 13). None of
these three assertions are true.
The first of the three foregoing assertions is mistaken because Mrs. Lindstrom
agrees with all of the determinative facts asserted by Carpets of America, see supra at 3,

~

and expressly relies on the facts as they existed at the time the Notice of Lien and
Clarified Notice of Lien were recorded. Specifically, she relies on the fact that at the time

~
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those purported liens were recorded, Paul was no longer an owner of the Home,
notwithstanding that Carpets of America was unaware of that fact at that time. (See Brief
of the Appellant 15, 24 (maintaining that Carpets of America's purported liens are
wrongful because Paul was "not an owner of the Home when he signed [the] note," but
acknowledging that "the Wrongful Lien Act places on a person who unknowingly records
a wrongful lien the burden of paying actual damages caused by the wrongful lien").
The second of Carpets of America's three foregoing assertions-that "notice [of
the Divorce Decree] should retroactively make Carpets of America's Liens wrongful"is also mistaken. Mrs. Lindstrom does not assert that those liens became wrongful only
once Carpets of America received notice of the Divorce Decree. Rather, she asserts that
those liens were wrongful at the time they were recorded because at that time Paul
Lindstrom, who signed the Promissory Note authorizing the Notice of Lien and Clarified
Notice of Lien, was not an owner of the Home. (See Brief of the Appellant 15.)
The last of Carpets of America's three foregoing assertions-that Mrs. Lindstrom
asks this Court to "convert[] Carpets of America's secured loan into an unsecured
loan"-is likewise mistaken. Carpets of America had, and still has, a secured loan. It is
secured by "all real and personal property ... held [as of February 2, 2011], or
[there]after acquired, by [Paul]." (R. 16.) Mrs. Lindstrom simply asserts that as of
February 2, 2011, the Home was not property held by Paul and, therefore, that Carpets of
America's loan to Paul was never secured by the Home. See Lund, 674 P.2d at 109 ("The
interest of [the husband] was at best a naked paper title, divested in the divorce action and
awarded to his wife to which [the] claimed lien could not have attached ....").
16
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Because Carpets of America does not directly dispute Mrs. Lindstrom's analysis
of Eldridge and Pratt-particularly the fact that Eldridge rests on this Court's
unwillingness to add to the definition of "wrongful lien" an element not found in the
lj)

plain language of the Wrongful Lien Act, see 2007 UT App 243, if 50-and because each
of her oblique challenges to Mrs. Lindstrom's argument based on those cases are
mistaken, this Court should conclude that the trial court's holding is at odds with this
Court's decisions in Eldridge and Pratt.
CONCLUSION

This Court should review de novo the trial court's conclusion that Mrs.
Lindstrom's Motion to Alter Judgment was actually a motion to reconsider, and hold that
the trial court's conclusion was erroneous. This Court should also conclude that the racenotice statute does not apply to this case and that Carpets of America has otherwise failed
to effectively rebut the statutory construction and case law analysis set forth by Mrs.
Lindstrom in her opening brief. Based on that conclusion, the Court should issue the
orders requested in the Conclusion section of Mrs. Lindstrom's opening brief.
DATED this ({/!:day of April, 2016.
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